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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ROBERT E. )fANNING, 
Plantiff and Appellant; 
vs. Case No. 7276 
JAMES l\1. POWERS, 
RE1S.PONDENT'S BRIEF 
OPENING STATEMENT 
Appellant's opening statement in the form of ''Ques-. 
tions Presented" is so obviously calculated to incite 
pre-judice and sympathy as to suggest an effort to con-
fuse the evidence .and issues. We cannot accept the con-
clusions of eo~_sel as fact or as an;y evidence of the facts. 
Appellant's comment that "defendant's testimony is 
disproven not only by the physical facts, but by all eye 
witness·es to the accident'' is as unfounded as the false 
theory that counsel attempted· to put over to the jury, 
namely: that defendant ran deceased down by striking; 
the rear of th·~ bicycle as it was headed down the street 
in a general southerly direction. 
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The jury after hearing all the evidence saw the fal-
lacy of appellant's theory and returned_ a unanimous 
verdict of no cause of action. Therefore, this court is not 
requir-ed to take that view of the evidence- which is most 
favorable to appellant (which appellant takes for 
granted) because if the verdict is sustained by the evi-
dence, the judgment should be affirmed. 
B-ecause of the distorted picture painted by counsel, 
we have hereafter summarized the testimony of each 
witness and physical evidence, which proves the inconsis-
tency of plaintiff's claims. 
No Dispute as to th-e Course of Tra v~el of the Bicycle· 
Before It Suddeny Turned 
There was no dispute in the pleadings or the evi-
dence that the Manning boy just prior to the accident 
was traveling south in the west ~edge of the pavement 
or a. few inches on the shoulder. Plaintiff so alleged 
a~d P.~~V,ed. · ( Tr. 1). 
Sole Disputed· Fact 
The sole dispute arose by reason of plaintiff's alle-
gations that defendant was 'travling south in the mo-st 
w>esterly lane and ran down the boy, striking the rear 
fender of the bicycle- W:ith the right front of his car, 
whereas defendant" contends' he, defendant, was traveling 
in the Zooe' of t·ra4fic' next. to the oenter ·of the highW'OI!J, 
and that the . Manning. boy s:uddenly and without any 
warning ·or ·signal turned direct~y into the right front 
fender of defendant's car. 
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As the sole basis for proving his contention, counsel 
for plaintiff at the trial produced the bicycle, which had 
a dent in the rear fender and which counsel claimed 
could only have been caused by contact with the front 
of defendant's car. All the physical evidence demon-
strates the fallacy of that theory. 
FACTS AND EVIDENCE 
The accident occured October 6, 1947, a few minutes 
after 8 :40 .. A .. ~f. on Second West Street between Sixth 
and Seventh South Streets in Salt Lake City. It was 
clear and dry, ~s.econd West being a paved four lane 
through or arterial highway with wide gravel shoulders. 
The regulated speed was 35 m.p.h. (Tr. 205-6). There 
was a traffic light at 6th South; then none until 9th 
South. There was no one on the street other than defen-
dant and Robert Manning. 
D~efendant's Testimony 
Defendant, James W. Powers, a salesman residing 
at Brigham City, Utah, testified he wa.s driving his 1946 
Nash sedan south on Second West. He had stop1ped for 
the red light at Sixth South (Tr. 214); then proceeded 
south in the lane of traffic next west of the center line 
(Tr. 214). As he proceeded south, he observed the Man-
ning boy coming out from the west side of the street 
(from one of the driveways about in the middle of the 
block) (Tr. 324) and watched him turn south ahead of 
him on Second West, the boy heading south on his bicycle 
along the extreme west edge of the concrete, possibly six 
inches onto the shoulder or possibly six inches on the con-
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crete ( Tr. 216.) \\rhen he, Manning, ca1ne out of the drive .. 
way, he turned onto the highway, making the usual curve 
and continuing in a southerly direction along the edge of 
the highway. As he did so, he, defendant, was approxi-
mately 60 or 70 feet back of the boy (Tr. 325). They 
both proceeded directly south in a parallel. direction 
(there being one lane for traffic between them), the car 
moving ahead a little faster than the bicycle. When de-
fendant's car was nearly parallel with the bicycle, or 
possibly thelength of the car behind (Tr. 216), the Man-
ning boy suddenly and without warning turned abruptly 
toward the east side of the street and into the right front 
of defendant's car (Tr. 215-17). The front wheel of the 
bicycle struck the front fender of the car (Tr. 216). To 
avoid the accident, defendant himself turned toward the 
east and applied his brakes ( Tr. 216). After the impact, 
he momentarily released his brakes to keep' out of the 
way of northbound traffic, and stopped east of the paved 
portion on Second West ( Tr. 216). He testified deceased 
gave no signal and he, defendant, saw no reason for 
the boy making a turn until he commenced to turn. The 
bicycle was at no time in front of defendant's car (Tr. 
216). Defendant estimated his own speed at twenty-five 
to thirty miles per hour. It was a thirty-five mile zone. 
Physical Evidence 
As appellant claims defendant's testimony is dis-
proven by the physical facts, and as most of the witnesses 
testified with refeTence to the map, we have inserted 
herein a copy of the relevant portion of the map, Plain-
tiff's Exhibit A (the original, but not the inserted map 
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being to the scale of one inch equals ten feet). During 
the final part of the trial, it was necessary for defendant 
to recall Mr. Tipton, the engineer who prepared the map, 
to explain that it showed only one-half or approximately 
320 feet of the sDuth one-half of the block, showing Sev-
enth South, but not Sixth South (Tr. 338-40). 
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Polnt of Impact 
The lanes for traffic were ten feet in width (Tr. 248). 
The investigating officers determined the point of im-
pact as being at the spot marked "X", being 12 feet east 
fronl the west edge of the ptavement and 143 feet north 
of the north curb on Seventh South. At that point, ''there 
was a real small black mark indicating rubber or some-
thing sliding along the pavement for maybe six inches; 
and then a series of scratches and digs in the pavement 
leading off to the side of the road (Tr. 248-9, 132). 
Tire Marks 
The tire marks made by defendant's car commenced 
in the middle .of the lane of traffic next t;o the center line, 
30 feet south of the P'oint of imp1act .or point marked u X" 
on the diagram (Tr. 252, 132). Officer 'S,parks explained 
that in drawing the tire marks on the diagram and in 
his original notes, he had not drawn them to scale, hut 
they were free hand (Tr. 262-3). It should be observed, 
therefore, that according to the scale of the map, the tire 
marks would have shown up in the middle of the lane of 
traffic next west of the center line three inches south. 
of the point of impact, marked ''X'', which would be one 
and a half to two inches north from where_ he actually 
placed them on the diagram, plaintiff's exhibit A. 
Marks on Car and Bicycle 
The pictures, Plaintiff's Exhibit C and D, show the 
small dent just to th·e right of the right headlight where 
the front fender of the bicycle scraped the car, and both 
pictures show the large dent in the side on the right front 
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door and the marks and scratches toward and in the run-
ning board (Tr. 256-7). Exhibit C shows a bend in the 
lower part of the rear fender. There was also "dust-
disturbed on the right front fender running back toward 
the back end of the fender (Tr. 257). In addition to the 
large dent on the right front door, the door handle was 
bent into an upward position (Tr. 257). See Exhibit D. 
The bicycle, Plaintiff's Exhibit B, had two substan-
tial dents, one on the left side of the front fender, which 
had been bent in against the front wheel, that is, into the 
tire to such extent that it was necessary for O·fficer 
Sparks to pull the fender out back into position so the 
"rheel would turn ( Tr. 358). The same fender had also 
been torn loose from its attachment on the frame (Tr. 
257). See the ~picture; Defendant's Exhibit 3. The other 
1nark was the indentation or crease on the. hark of thP 
rear fender hereinafter mentioned. 
Position of Body and Bicycle 
The boy was lying in the center of the west lane and 
the bicycle just north of him, substantially as illustrated 
on the diagram, except his head was pointing in a north-
westerly direction, his head being six feet from the west 
edge of the pavement ( Tr. 250, 200) and thirty-five feet 
south from the point of impact (Tr. 251). Exhibit 4 
shows blood stains where the blood ran toward the west 
(Tr. 351-2). An "X" was marked on that exhibit by 
Officer Sparks showing where the head was lying on the 
pavem.ent. Manning's lunch which he had held in his 
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These undispute·d physical facts establish the posi-
tion of def~ndant's automobile as being in the lan·e of 
traffic next to the center line and indicate the manner in 
which the bicycle and rider, after striking the front fen-
der on an angle, came into contact with the side of the 
car. The large dent and the damaged door handle are 
the only explanation of how deceased met his death, by 
reason of the skull fracture and depression in the rear of 
deceased's head, described by Dr. Jack Cox as being the 
most probable caus·e of instantaneous death. (Tr. 121). 
Plaintiff's Claim 
In offering the bicycle as an exhibit (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2), counsel pointed out the dent in the rear fen-
der claimed to be th·e point of impact as between the 
right front fender of defendant's car and the bicycle. To 
so presume, however, ignores the d·ent on th·e left side of 
the front fender ( S·ee the bicycle, Plaintiff's Exhibits 
and the picture. Defendant's Exhibit 3), obviously made 
when it first came in contact with the car, sliding along 
the right side of the car. Viewmg ~all the evidence: it is 
clear trhe d~agonal c.reas~e iln the rear fe11J.der of the bicycle 
covuld wot have been oOJUsed by the mark or defnt ju.st t.o 
the rig'ht ~of the right headlight of defendamt's ca·r. Nor 
is appellant's claim that the-re was some slight red paint 
brushed into the dent any proof when both the car and 
bicycle were painted red. n order to believe appellant's 
theory, one would have to ignore all th·e physical facts 
and further indulge in the wildest kind of speculation as 
to how the dent in the fender of defendant's car could 
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hav-e raused the angular dent in the rear fender of the 
bicycle. 
Plaintiff's Witnesses 
The only witnesses called by plaintiff were illrich 
Stark, an elderly farme~ from Freedom, Sanpete County, 
\vho had not disclosed his pres.ence, nor given his name 
to the investigating officers at the time of the accident 
( Tr. 186) and LeRoy Iverson, one of the three investiga-
ting officers, who was only called in an effort to prove 
speed based on tire marks. 
Ulrich Stark 
Ulrich Stark, visiting here for October Conference 
(Tr. 176), said that he was walking casually south on the 
east sidewalk between Sixth and Seventh South (Tr. 177) 
standing ·east of the light pole at the place marked 2 on 
the map (Tr. 188). He testified to having seen the Man-
ning boy riding his bicycle south on the west side of the 
street next to the pav·ernent (Tr. 1'78). In first describing 
the accident, he testified: 
'' Q. At that time, what did you see about an auto-
mobile on that street~ 
A. Well, the boy was ahead and the auto1nobile 
carne right behind it, and the first t.hing I 
know, the boy W'as laying down on the parP-
rnent." (Tr. 179) 
Immediately thereafter, while co·unsel by leadirig got the 
witness· to conclude that the automobile was in the west 
lane and· corning along behind struck the bicycl.e ( Tr~ 79) 
that testimony· was entirely negatived by the later testi-
10 
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mony coming out on both direct and cross examination. 
We quote: 
On direct exrunination : 
''Q. What was the thing that first attracted your 
attention to the accident~ 
A. \V ell, I was coming down the road and this 
bike here, then the automobile, then I he1ard 
the screech of the ca.r, and the c'nash." ( Tr. 
184) 
On cross examination : 
''Q. Did you have a clear view of the boy on the 
bicycle just before the accident occured ~ 
A. No. I just seen him, that was all. It was done 
so quick I didn't know which was which. 
Q. You had ·a clear view of hiim, ~and yovu did!n'.t 
see him ag,ain until you s1aw him latying :on 
the paveme{YI)t? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did yovu see either he or the b1icycle movin,g 
on the pta.vement, after you s~aw him ridifng it. 
A. No sir. 
Q. When you observed the boy, did you observe 
whether or not he was carrying anything in 
either hand as he rode the bicycle~ 
A. I never noticed at all." (Tr. 187) 
It is easy to appreciate that from where elderly Mr. 
Stark was walking, having no idea an accident would 
occur, he could not place the exact respective positions 
of the bicycle and car. His testimony insofar as it tends 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to prove plaintiff's theory is certainly refuted by the 
physical facts and his own admissions on cross exami-
nation, confirming his original statement that he saw 
the boy on the bicycle but ( (didn't see him again until he 
w~as lying on the p~avement .. '' 
Stark's testimony could not he considered any 
strongeT than as shown on cross examination. Porter v. 
Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 Pac. 153; E·dw~ards v. OZark, 
96 Utah 121, 83 Pac. ( 2d) 1021. 
Office·r Iverson 
Leroy ~ verson said he was assisted in his investi-
gation by Officers Atkins and Sparks (Tr. 125). He de-
scribed the dent in the right fender and door and the 
brush marks along the door as shown in the pictures 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits C and D) (Tr. 126). He identified 
the bicycle pointing out the dent in the front and rear 
fenders (TT. 129), and placed the position of the body as 
drawn on the diagram (Tr. 130). 
In connection with the tire marks, he described them 
as heading in a southeasterly direction ''on an arch-way, 
arced." (TT. 130.) At the beginning they were very 
szright. As they went on toward the southeast they dark-
ened up. Ther·e was some debris in the street one hun-
dred forty-three feet north of Seventh South and thirty 
feet north of the north end of the tire marks. The actual 
tire marks started about thirty feet south of the debris, 
running eighty-three feet on the pavement and thirty 
feet into the gravel (Tr. 132). 
12 
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vVhen asked his opinion as to speed before answer-
ing on voir dire, Offic.er Iverson testified there were only 
t\v·o tire marks at the beginning or north ·end; that four 
tire marks con1menced sixty feet beyond or near the 
east edge of the pavement (S·ee map) (Tr. 137). From 
where the four tire marks commenced, the marks were 
black and deep into the gravel leading up to the r;ear of 
defendant's car (Tr. 137-8). The light tire marks indi-
cated the brakes had not been fully applied until near 
the eilge of the pavement (sixty feet from the point of 
con1mencement) (Tr. 137-8). So that at least two wheels 
had not been causing any friction for the first sixty 
feet (Tr. 138). The tire marks wer-e of different widths 
(Tr. 138). The solid brake or tire marks extended thirty 
feet in the gravel (T·r. 139). The fact that defendant's 
car \Vas turning or skidding would have a bearing on his, 
Iverson's calculation of speed (Tr. 141), and the fact 
that the car was turning or skidding would itself cause 
some visible imprint depending on the speed (Tr. 141). 
In his experience, he, Officer Iverson, had made no actual 
tests where the car was turning as defendant's car was 
turning (Tr, 142). With this uncertain background and 
over defendant's objection that the circumstances werie 
not proved with any certainty, and that the witness was 
not qualified in view of the speculative ·evidence ( Tr. 
144), he attempted to place defendant's speed at forty 
to forty-five miles per· hour (Tr. 144). That he did not 
understand the engineering formula for calculating 
speed is evident when he held up the trial being wholly 
unable to explain the formula or figur:es (Tr. 151-2). ~s .. 
13 
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S. Taylor, a qualified engineer, later, explained why. 
As to the scene of the accident, Iverson identified 
the pictures (Defendant's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4) as re-
presenting the scene of the accident existing when the 
accident occured (Tr. 146). 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 shows on the right side of the 
picture, the rear end of defendant's car where it stopped; 
also the brake marks from the rear of the car to where 
they left the pavement. The marks did not show up v:ery 
well on the pavement (Tr. 146-8). (See Spark's testi-
Inony to the same effect Tr. 265). 
Defendant's Exhibit 2 shows Second West looking 
south. In the picture, Iverson testified that the ordinary 
tire marks in the picture (wot caused by deferu]G!I1Jt's c1ar) 
show up rather clearly and do not indicate speed on the 
part of the vehicle involved ( Tr. 149-50). While other 
marks were readily observable in the pictures, it is sig-
nificant that in none of the pictures r·eferred to (D·efen-
dant's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3) are tire marks from defen-
dant's car visible with any degree of certainty. The only 
ones definitely shown are in the gravel on Defendant's 
Exhibit 1, directly back of defendant's car (Tr. 149-50). 
Manning Boy 
Plaintiff offered evidence that the Manning boy was 
eleven years of age, in the sixth grade, bright and above 
average intelligence ('Tr. 155). He was a m.ember of 
and a sergeant in the junior traffic boys or junior service 
organization at school. Only the most dep.endable and 
reliable boys were selected for this work, which required 
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~fanning before school hours to go from corner to cor-
ner to check the other traffic boys located at four desig-
nated intersections to see that they were present and per-
forming their duties. Robert used his bicycle in doing 
this 'York (Tr. 153). He was assigned to check the cor-
ners west of West Temple 'Street, including the intersec-
tion at Seventh South and Second West ( Tr. 154). School 
started at 9 :00 a.m. (Tr. 155). At school he had been 
taught safety rules and instructed by demonstrations and 
an illustrated movie film "Bicycling with Safety"· on 
all the rules of riding a bicycle, the proper way to sig-
nal, the proper side of the street, and other traffic rules 
and regulations (Tr. 156). He was familiar and well 
versed in those rules ( Tr. 156). ' 
At the time of the accident, there were four friends 
or school chums of Robert Manning on or near the north-
east corner of the intersection. Raymond Hubbard and 
Tommie Monahan, members of the school traffic patrol, 
had been patrolling the traffic on the north side of the 
intersection and were expecting Robert Manning that 
morning to check them at the intersection before contin-
uing on to school. Eddie Monahan was with these boys. 
Just before the accident occurred, the fourth boy, Robert 
or Bobbie Barnett, seeing Robert Manning riding south 
on the west edge of the highway (at the place marked 
O.B. on the map in front of Jensen Tire Co.) shouted: 
"Here comes Bob" and/or "Well, if it isn't Manning." 
(Tr. 119, 289). At that instant the Manning boy suddenly 
turned toward_ the east across the highway toward his 
friends coming into collision with defendant's c3:r. 
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At the trial, plaintiff's counsel did not call any of 
these boys to tell the facts of the accident, except to 
permit Eddie Monahan to describe the position of the 
bicycle after the accident occurred ( Tr. 112), and that 
he thereafter moved the bicycle leaning it against a 
parked car and later riding it to the Manning residence 
(Tr. 113-14), objecting to high heaven when an effort 
was made to cross examine the witness about the accident 
and the fact that he was expecting to meet deceased that 
morning. The court did finally permit him to testify 
as to his position on the north sidewalk of ;S:eventh South 
on the northeast corner just south of the service station 
where he marked it OE (Tr. 117) with Raymond Hubbard 
(Tr. 118), and Tommie Monahan (his brother) (Tr. 118-
9). ~ 
In addition to defendant himself, defendant called 
O·fficers Atkins and Sparks, the two investigation offi-
cers, the four boy friends of Robert Manning, who w·ere 
standing on or near the northeast corner of the inter-
section, and S. S. Taylor, an exp~ert on speed. 
Investigating Officers 
Officers Atkins and Sparks explained that they got 
to the scene of the accident within four minutes after 
receiving the radio call ( Tr. 198), and upon arrival, see-
ing the boy had not survived, commenced to make the 
usual fatality investigation, making a special effort to get 
full and complete statements from all witness·es and all 
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possible physical evidence, using a steel tape for accu-
racy (Tr. 200-1). 
Officer Atkins proceeded to get the names of wit-
nesses and get statements, including those of Bobbie Bar-
nett and Eddie Monahan, who sat in the back of his car 
(Tr. 201, 205·), while Officer Sparks investigated the phy-
sical evidence (Tr. 248). 
W. S. Sparks 
Sparks in addition to testifying to the physical evi-
dence hereinabove outlined, further ·e.xplained that the 
tire marks ''were very light marks, to start out with. 
You could hardly se·e them on the pavement. Had to 
get the light just (Tr. 252) right on them to see them, 
and they went in a circular direction toward the south-
east, and as they continued on they got heavier. The1e 
were only two (marks) to start out with, and they 
changed to four just before ~hey got off the concrete.'' 
The over-all length was 83 feet to the rear wheels of 
the car. The four wheel marks." started just before the 
car got off the concrete. They were 31 feet long.'' He 
illustrated the marks by drawing them on the diagram 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit A) (Tr. 253). He ~explained there 
was a difference bHtween a brake mark that is laid down 
when the brake is locked and a tire mark that is made 
when a car (wheels) is turning. When a brake is locked, 
the marks it leaves on the surface are very heavy and 
black ; and when a car is turning they are not near 
as wide, and they are not near as black or as easy to 
see. He didn't desigwa~te all83 fe.et as tire m1arks. He did 
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designate about 32 feet of them as such (Tr. 254), only 
part of the 32 feet being on thH pavement (Tr. 255). 
During his investigation, he tested defendant's car 
to get the maximum power out of it, and see if the brakes 
were good (Tr. 256). He dro¥e it hack to Sixth South 
and running it south on the highway, giving it all the 
power it had to get it up to forty miles per hour. At a 
point approximately 50 to 75 feet north of the point of 
impact he applied the brakes hard and stopped in 58 feet 
of real black, heavy tire marks on four whe~els. In test-
ing the car, he started out in low, got it up to about 
twenty miles per hour, then shifted into second and gave 
it all the gas it had. (Tr. 256). 
S. S. Taylor 
Mr. Taylor, a qualified expert on traffic engineering, 
including the analysis of accidents and determining of 
speeds of vehicles based on braking distanees (Tr. 326-7), 
explained the various formulas were used in computing 
speed ( Tr. 327 -8). He said that where the marks laid 
down 'vere not of such a nature as to evidence a con tinu-
ous locking or sliding of the tire, it would be impossible 
to determine speed based on any of the given forrnulas 
'' "\vithout testing the particular car involved and first 
ascertaining the percent,age of b·1iaking first applied." 
(Tr. 330). From the formulas ordinarily used, and in par-
ticular of the one used by Officer Iverson, with only 31 
feet of ·definite brake marks, it would be impossible to 
accurately calculate the spe~ed of defendant's car from 
the physical evidence. (Tr. 330-1-2). He further explained 
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that in Inaking a turn the car would leave visible tire 
marks W'"hich could be seen and photographed even though 
the brakes may not have been applied or only partially 
applied. ( Tr. 331-2). He further exp~lained reaction time 
and that the average reaction time was about 3;4 of a 
second ( Tr. 334). 
Raymond Hubbard 
Raymond said he was eleven years, In the sixth 
grade, and resided at 339 West 6th South (Tr. 286-7). 
He had lmo,vn Robert Thianning during all of their school 
years. He "Tas on the traffic patrol, servicing the inter-
section mentioned (Tr. 287). Robert Manning regularly 
checked the corner every morning, but had not as yet 
checked this particular day. Just before the accident, 
he ''Tas walking to school with Eddie and Tommie 1Iona-
han at the point marked OR on the diagram (being on 
the north sidewalk of S·eventh :South Street just east of 
the intersection) (Tr. 288) .. He said: "The only thing 
that attracted my attention to it was when Bobbie· Bar-
nett called to him.'' Bobbie Barnett was on his bicycle at 
the point designated OB, just west of the Jensen Tire 
Company on the east side of Second West Street. Bobbie 
called, ''Well if it isn't Manning,'' and just then Eddie 
Monahan ran over to the corner (Tr. 289). He turned 
around and talked to say somthing to Tommie, but he 
saw the bicycle and car come together. He had first seen 
the defendant's car up the street about opposite the fi-
gure 2 (which was a short distance north of the point 
of impact). He thought the car was about in the middle 
of the two lanes, referring to the two west lanes. 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. What did Bobbie do as the car approached 
Robert Manning~ 
A. Well, he turned out to miss those two cars, o.r 
he was going t~o come over to us, but he 
turned out in front of the car. 
Q. Did you s.ee him turn out~ 
A. Yes. (Tr. 290). 
Q. Did you observe whether or not he made any 
_ kind of signal before he turned~ 
A. I don't think he did.'' 
He saw the bicycle and car come together, but he was 
not sure what part of the bicycle struck what part of the 
car. Bobbie Manning was carrying his lunch in his right 
hand. After the accident, Eddie ran over to where the 
body was lying. He and Tommie later left for school. 
When Bobbie Barnett called, "If it isn't Manning" the 
accident had not then occurred. That was before the 
accident occur:r;ed (Tr. 291-2). 
On cross-examination, he stated he wasn't paying 
much attention to the automobile. Whether it was in the 
center of one or the center of another of the particular 
lanes of traffic, he didn't pretend to state. He was look-
ing more ca~efully at the Manning boy (Tr. 292). He 
had expected Robert Manning to check him that morning 
before school (Tr. 293). Before Robert M·anning turned, 
he was headed due south. When he turned, he went in a 
southeast dire-ction (Tr. 294). 
Tommi~e Monahan 
Tommie was Eddie's brother and was in the sixth 
grade, r-esiding at 335 West 6th South (Tr. 311). He 
was standing with Raymond Hubbard and Eddie Mona-
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han. The first thing that attracted his attention to Rob-
ert l\Ianning ·u'as Bobbi-e Barnett calli;n.g to him. Manning 
was just waving a.t Bobbie and then ''started turning.'' 
Then the car hit him. He could not describe the point of 
contact. Before Manning turned, he was going south 
(Tr. 312). After he turned he was going southeast, turn-
ing over into the direction where they were standing. 
''I don't think he signalled, but if he did, I didn't see 
him.'' He was watching him until the accident happened. 
He didn't see the car until it occurred. He didn't have 
any opinion as to the sp·eed of the car, other than "it 
was going about as fast as all the other cars along there 
go." ( Tr. 313). 
On cross examination, he refused to state that the 
automobile hit the back of the bicycle. He ·did see Bobbie 
Manning riding right along on the shoulder toward the 
parked cars on the shoulder ( Tr. 316). ''I just saw him 
turn-then there was a crash.'' (Tr. 317). After the ac-
cident he didn't see any cars move away from the scene. 
The cars that were there just r~emained right there, and 
the bicycle was plac.ed leaning against the outstide car. 
(Tr. 318). 
Robert Barnett 
Robert Barnett testified he was riding his bicycle 
north on the ·east side of the street at about the point 
marked OB on the diagram. He first saw Robert Man-
ning riding his bicycle on the shoulder south on Second 
West in front of Ashworth Transfer Company (marked 
on the diagram). He was going straight on (Tr. 296, 
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299). \Vhen he saw Robert Manning, he ''hollered to 
him, 'Oh, no, if it isn't Manning.' (Tr. 2'96). He (Man-
ning) waved at me with his left hand; then put his hand 
back on his handlebars.'' He did not see Manning make 
any signal. -After the impact he got off his bike and ran 
over to Robert, who was lying about in the position shown 
on the diagram (Tr. 297). He didn't know how far the 
car was on the pavement (Tr. 300). His impression of it 
'vas that part of the car was on the outside lane and part 
of it was on the inside lan~. Both "kept on going right 
along there-until he (Manning) turned out." (Tr. 301). 
He did not tell Attorney Willard Hanson (when they 
visited the scene of the accident) "that the automobile 
was right behind the bicycle.'' What he meamt w1as that 
the bicycle was right ~on the edge of the ed:ge of the road 
(Tr. 302). 
While this witness on cross examination was finally 
led to say that the automobile had hit the rear of the 
bicycle ( Tr. 307), this was only when this immatur,e wit-
ness was confronted with a signed statement obtained by 
Attorney Willard Hanson from the boy at his home, 
couched in counsel's own language (Tr. 305-'7). When 
an effort was made by defendant to show surprise based 
on what Robert Barnett had said in his original state-
ment to (he police officers, defendant was prevented from 
using the statement by reason of counsel's objections 
that it was an effort to impeach defendant's own wit-
ness. (Tr. 309-11). 
Eddie Monahan 
Eddie Monahan, walking wi'th his brother and Ray-
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n1ond Hubbard, sa\Y Robert ~fanning riding south on the 
\Ye~t edge of the high\vay-\Yest edge of the concrete. 
He heard Bobbie holler to hin1 and saw Bobbie Manning 
turn \Y·ithout signalling and tne car and bicycle con1ing 
together. He had no opinion as to the speed of the car 
(Tr. 278-9). He thought the car was traveling bet\v·een 
the two \vest lanes of traffic just before the accident ( Tr. 
281). \Vnen he sa\v the car and bicycle, the car was a 
little ahead of the bike. The bike was west of the auto-
mobile. They weren't very close. He "knew Bobbie 
turned,'' but he didn't know whereabouts in there." 
(Tr. 284). 
QUESTI•ONS FOR REVIEW 
Appellant has made six assignments of error which 
can be divided into two groups, namely: 
1. Is the verdict supported by the evidence~ 
2. Was there prejudicial error in the instructions to 
the juryT 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR· NO. I 
THE VERDICT WAS MORE THAN SUSTAINED 
BY THE EVIDENCE 
While most of the eye witnesses were boys, friends 
of deceased, th·ere is no real or substantial inconsistency 
with their testimony and the testimony of defendant. 
Inasmuch as plaintiff did not call these boys as witnesses, 
defendant was obligated, or at least justified in so doing, 
although he was thereby precluded from showing their 
original statements as given to the investigating officers 
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j ns t after the accident occurred. Practically the only 
variance in their testimony as compared with that of 
defendant was that they placed defendant's car as being 
straddle the two lanes of traffic. Howev.er, the physical 
facts establish defendant's position in the lane of traffic 
next to the center of the highway. The boys were not 
certain as to the exact position of the car and from 
where they were could not too accurately judge. 
We have reviewed the testimony of all the witnesses 
and called particular attention to the p1hysical evidenc·e 
to show that appellant's claim that the v.erdict is not 
sustained by the evidence is not well taken. Rather the 
physical evidence viewed in the light of all the testimony 
corroborates defendant's version and establishes the 
proximate cause of the accident as being the negligence 
of Robert Manning in suddenly turning from a direct 
course on· the edge of the pavement or shoulder across a 
lane of t.'J1affic and imm·ediately into defendant's right 
front fender. The evidence not only sustains the verdict, 
but no other conclusion is reasonable under all of the 
evidence. 
In R'ichards v. Balace L(JfiJ!Ybdry, 55 Utah 409, 186 
Pac. 439, plaintiff was riding a bicycle north on State 
Street. To keep out of the way of an automobile coming 
fron1 behind, plaintiff turned his bicycle to the west and 
in so doing, one of the bicycle wheels went into a de-
pression or ''groove'' in the rail of a street car track, 
causing the bicycle to fall, plaintiff falling on the west 
Ride of the highway about twenty or thirty feet in front 
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of defendant's truck approaching from the north at nine 
to fifteen Iniles per hour. Plaintiff's foot was crushed by 
the truck. The court held there was no evidence- that the 
driver of defendant's truck saw plaintiff fall in front of 
the truck in tiine t.o have stopped before passing over 
his foot. .A .. non-suit ''Tas sustained on appeal. 
See also Ka.1ca.gu.chi v. Bennett, ______ Utah ------, 189 
Pac. (2d) 109, "\Yhere a school child was unexp·ectedly 
pushed in front of defendant's bus and there was insuf-
ficient time to avoid the accident. A v·erdict of no cause 
of action \Ya.s sustained. 
Where the jury finds the issues in favor of defend-
ant, that view of the evidence must be resolved which is 
most favo-rable to defendant, that is, the view which sus-
tains the verdict. 
Carter t:. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 
Pac. 259; 
Flinders v. Hwnter, 60 Utah 314, 208 Pac. 526; 
Harris v. Ogden St. La. Co., 39 Utah 436, 117 Pac. 
700· 
' 
A.ngerman Co. v. Edgerm.an, 76 Utah 394, 290 Pac. 
169· 
' 3 Am. J ur. Sec. 888, page 44; Sec. 889, page 448 ; 
·S.ec. 901, page 468; Sec. 903, page 472. 
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT IQ·F ERROR NiO·. II 
THE COURT DID NOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE 
DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTO·RY NEGLIGENCE, 
BUT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
THE RESPECTIVE STATUTORY AND C·OMMON 
I-'A W DUTIES OF BOTH PARTIES. 
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Appellant's criticism of the court's instructions is 
not justified in that he singles out isolated parts of the 
instructions without r'eviewing them as a whole, and with-
out any consideration of the issues defined by the plead-
ings and several statutory provisions involved. 
Both parties allege several grounds of negligence 
and contributory negligence, each of which was denied 
by the other. It was, therefoe, incumbent upon the court 
to instruct the jury on each specific claim, defining the 
la'v and the duties of each, leaving the issues of fact 
to be determined by the jury. The only instructions in 
'vhich contributory negligence was covered, other than 
in a general sense, were instructions Nos. 12 to 16 
inclusive, or five instructions (Tr. 354-7). 
Of these, the court's instruction No. 12 (Tr. 63, 354-
5) instructed the jury with respect to the statutory law 
or duty defined under Sect~on 57-7-133, (a), prohibiting 
the turning of a vehicle from a direct course upon a high-
way unless and until such movement could be made with 
reasonable safety. 
The court's instruction No. 13 (Tr. 64, 355) ex-
plained the statutory law with respect to making a signal 
before turning in the manner defined under Sect,ion 57-7-
135 (1), by -extending the hand horizontally for a distance 
of one hundred feet, as further defined under Section 
57-7-133. 
By instruction No. 14 (Tr. 65, 356), the court in-
structed the jury on the provisions of 1S;ection 57-7-128, 
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relating to the necessity of keeping entirely within a 
single lane unless movement therefrom could be n1ade 
with reasonable safety. 
By the court's instruction No. 15 (Tr. 356), the court 
instructed the jury as to plaintiff's duty in keeping a 
proper lookout, 'vhich duty is well established by this 
court. 
Bullock -v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 Pac. (2d) 350; 
Sine v. S. L. Tra;nsport,atlion C.o., 106 Utah 289, 
147 Pac. (2d) 875; 
Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 680. 
The court's instruction No. 16 (Tr. 357) instructed 
the jury that if the plaintiff, Robert Manning, "negli-
gently drove his bicycle from a place of safety into the 
side of defendant's automobile, and that such act, if any, 
proximately contributed in any degree to cause the col-
lision, the plaintiff could not recover." It is well estab-
lished law that one can be negligent in car~elessly moving 
from a place of safety into a place of danger, and it was 
proper to so instruct the jury. 
S,ection 57-7-148 makes bicycles subject to the motor 
vehicle act. 
While plaintiff complains of the court's instruction 
No. 17 (Tr. 357), that instruction did not relate to con-
tributory negligence, but to the duty of plaintiff and his 
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QUALIFYING INSTRU·CTIONS 
Each of the instructions given on contributory negli-
gence were qualified by the court's instruction No. 3, 
defining "negligence", "contributory negligence", "or-
dinary care" and "proximate cause", (Tr. 348-9) "or-
dinary care'' h~ing defined as follows : 
'' 'Ordinary care' is that degree of care 
which a reasonably prudent person would use 
under the same or similar circumstances. 'Or-
dinary care' implies the exercise of reasonable 
diligence and such watchfulness, caution and fore-
sight as 1JJYIJder ·all the ci~rcumst~ances of the parti-
cular case would be exercised by a reasonably 
careful, prudent person;'' 
Each instruction was further qualified by the court's 
instruction No. 4 (Tr. 349): 
''That said Robert Manning was under a 
duty to exercise that degree of care for his own 
safety which would ordinarily be used by an or., 
dinarily prudent boy of the same age, capacity 
and ·experience.'' 
Said instruction further told the jury that they were to 
presu1ne deceased "ras in the exercise of due care unless 
there "\vas actual proof to the contrary. 
The jury was further instructed that the instruc-
tions though numbered seperately were: 
''to be considered and construed by you as 
one connected whole. Each instruction should be 
read and understood with reference to and as a 
part of the entire charge and not as though one 
in·struction separately was intended to present 
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the \Yhole la\Y of the case upon any particular 
point," etc. ( Tr. 361-2). 
By instruction K o. 2 ( Tr. :~-±7), the jury \Va8 told that 
defendant had the burden of proYing contributor~· negli-
gence. 
DUTY OF 'THE COURT rro INSTR ..UC1, ON ALL 
ISSUES 
It is \Yell-established la\Y that defendant is entitled 
to have the case subn1itted to the jury on any theory 
justified by defendant's evidence, as well as upon the 
theory of the whole evidence, and failure to instruct 
the jury on a Inaterial issue would affect defendant's 
substantial rights. 
Morgarn v. Bingham St.age Ditnes Co., 75 Utah 87, 
283 Pac. 160; 
Bartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pac. 
522; 
Pratt v. Uta.h Light & T.r. Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 Pac. 
868; 
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893. 
See also Reid's B~ans1on Instructi.ons to Ju.ri.es, 
3rd Ed. lr ol1, Sec. 52, Page i55, where the author states: 
"It is the duty of the court to submit all such 
issues, both affirmative and negative.'' 
And at page 157 : 
''It is not enough to give the theory of one 
of the parties, both in the affirmative and the 
negative, but the court should also give the theory 
of the other party. The affirmative charge should 
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he given though a general charge may have been 
given to the same effect.'' 
See also Vol. 1 Btashfi.eld' s Instructions to Juries, 
2nd Ed., pa.ges 218-9: 
''Instructions to the jury should not ignore 
any of the issues, theories or defenses. * * * 
Whether the court believes ·the evidence or not, 
the issues must be presented to the jury." 
The duty of the court to instruct on all issues is 
especially important where the alleged claim of negli-
genee or contributory negligence is expr~essly denied by 
the opposing pa.rty. See Smith v. Columbus Buggy C·o., 
40 Utah 580, 123 Pac. 580. 
To Combline Instructions May Be Error 
Whil·e it may ~·e possible to give correct instructions 
h~~ combining so1ne of them, some discretion is given to 
the trial· court as to the form of the instructions given, 
con1bining the instructions has sometimes lead to confu-
sion and is error. 
In Leete v. Hayes, (Iowa), 233 N. W. 481, where 
several g!f"lownds of negligence were ·alleged, and den~ed 
by the opp1osing P'arty, it w~as held errOtr to growp the 
se;p1ar;ate cl.aims of sep~ar.ate and distinct acts of negli-
gence int:o one instruction. 
See also Reid.'s Bro;nson lnst.ructions t;o Juries, 3rd 
Ed. 17 ol. 1, at page 248: 
"While it is the duty of the court to give 
instructions declaring the law applicable to all 
phases of the case, it is discretionary with the 
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judge whether or not to elaborate upon instruc-
tions given that do fairly cover the case. Each 
instruction should be complete, though it is not 
required to contain all the law applicable to the 
case. * * * "\Vhere several i te1ns of negligence are 
charged against the defendant in an automobile 
accident case, they should be set forth in s~evparrajte 
instrncti.on.._~, and it is error to group th~em. '' 
At page 246: 
''Great importance is not attached to the 
matter of form of instructions provided they are 
germane to the issues and are correct statements 
of the law." 
At page 249: 
''There is no Med rule as to the order of 
the instructions. This matter is at the choiee of 
the court. ' ' 
In Smith v. Columbus Buggy Com.p~arn.lJ, supra, at 
pages 596-7 of the Utah report, this court pointed out 
that the trial judge has some discretion as to the form 
of instructions, and there is no error simply becauS:e they 
are not in the precise form requested or desired by coun-
sel. 
CO-EQUAL INSTRU~CTIONS GIVEN ON DEFENDANT'S 
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE 
The court did not over emphasize contributory negli-
gence as compared to the instructions given on defend-
ant's alleged negligence. By reciprocal instructions, the 
court instructed the jury upon the specific duties of de-
fendant, in each instance stating that defendant vvas 
liable if they found him negligent. By the court's in-
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struction No. 1, the fove specifioally alteg.ed C'Zakims of 
negligence were stated (Tr. 343-6), and by the court's 
instructions Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 ( Tr. 350-3) the court 
defined each separate duty of def·endant and told the 
jury that defendant was liable for such negligence if 
they found him guilty of any one of the claimed alleged 
violations. 
The court's instruction N·o. 5 (Tr. 350) referred to 
all the alleged acts of negligence. 
Instruction No. 6 ( Tr. 350) extensively covered de-
fendant's duties as to speed. 
Instruction No. 7 ( Tr. 351) specifically covered de-
fendant's statutory duties in passing another vehicle. 
Instruction No. 8 (Tr. 352) covered defendant's 
duties in passing, and in addition thereto his duties re-
specting sounding the horn or signalling in passing. 
Instruction No.9 (Tr. 353) defined defendant's duty 
regarding lookout. 
In each of these instructions, the jury was instructed 
that a violation of one of these duties by defendant was 
negligence, and that if such negligence was the proxi-
rnate cause, in the absence of contributory neglig·ence, 
def.endan t was liable. 
From the foregoing, it is seen that the court in-
structed mutually on the respective duties of each of 
the parties. There was no particular emphasis on the 
def.ense of contributory negligence as against or com-
pared to the claim of negligence of defendant. 
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.... -\.t page 340, l"'" olume 1, Blashfield-'s Instructions to 
J·u.ries, 2nd Edlif'ion, Section 1±7, the author says: 
"If the substance of the evidence for both 
parties is fairly and impartially stated, one party 
cannot complain that the evidence of his adver-
sary is rnore fully or pron1inently stated than his 
0\\Tll. '' 
See also Reid's Branson In-struction to Jur-ies, ~)rd 
Ed., r .. ol. 1, at page 291 : 
"The fact that the contentions of one party 
·are stated at greater length than tho8e of the 
other party does not conclusively show that un-
due stress is laid upon the contentions of the 
other.'' 
Particularly in view of the instructions given on de-
fendant's negligence, \\-e fail to see or appreciate \Yhere 
there \vas any particular emphasis on contributory negli-
gence as compared with the instructions on the negli-
gence of defendant. 
APPELLANT'S AUTHORITIES, DISTIN·GUI8HED 
In the citation of authorities, appellant fails to con-
sider the distinction between the court's singling out 
particular facts or evidence, as distinguished fron1 in-
structing the jury on the law, as for example, in negli-
gence cases where instructions are given relative to the 
legal duties of ·each party. The former is sometirues an 
invasion of the province of the jury as constituting conl-
nlents on the evidence, whereas the latter is the proper 
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The case of Va.liO'tis v. Utah A1p1ex Minimg Co., 55 
Utah 151, 184 Pac. 802, cited at page 11 of Appellant's 
Brief, illustrates. In that case a r~quested instruction. 
'vhich contained the following language: 
''Nor are you to presume or infer any negli-
. gence on the part of the defendant merely be-
cause a round was loose or broken.'' 
was held to be properly refused in that the request 
tended to invade the province of the jury as to the in--
ferences of fact to be drawn, and therefore the requested 
instruction was properly refused, particularly when the 
respective theories of the parties werie fairly covered by 
the. instructions given. ;S:ee pages 157-9 of the Utah re-
port. 
In Intervnational & G. N. R. Co. v. Newman, (Tex.) 
40 S. W. 854, at page 11 of Appellant's Brief, the court 
held there was no prejudicial error, affirming a verdict 
for plaintiff. 
In Cart~e.r v. Miss1ovuri K. & T. R;ailw1ay Co., (·~ex.) 
160 S. W. 987, at page 12 of Appellant's Brief, the 
repetition in the court's instructions of the definition of 
assumption of risk was held not r,eversible error. The 
court said that it is accepted doctrine. that such repeti-
tions are not reversible error, particularly 
''When the repetitions are .necessary in order 
to apply any given rule of law to the various 
phases of the case raised by the ·evidence.'' 
In Wiser v. Cop·el(JJ}1pd;, (Ariz.) 203 Pac. 565, at page· 
14 of Appellant's Brief, a pedestrian was hjt by a west-
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bound car. One of defendant's requested instructions 
read: 
'~You are instructed that the defendant had 
the legal right to drive his vehicle upon any part 
of the right of the said McDowell Road, whether 
the srune \Yas that part described in evidence as 
paved or unpaved, and you ca,nnot find. him guiNy 
of negligence Inerely because you may find that 
he drove his machine in part upon the unpaved 
portion of said road.'' 
In holding there \Yas not reversible error in refusing 
the request, the c.ourt pointed out that negligence n1ust 
be determined from all the circumstances, and had the 
1nstruction been given: 
"The jury might well have concluded that if 
the appellant had not been negligent in the driv-
ing of his car (in fact, partly upon the unpaved 
portion of the road) that the injury would not 
have been inflicted. ' ' 
Considering the instructions of the court taken in 
their entirety, there was no particular over en1phasis on 
contributory negligence as compared to the instructions 
given on defendant's alleged negligence. The specific 
instructions given were on issues denied by defenda:n.t 
and involved several statutory and co1n1non law duties 
on which the court was obligated to instruct. All instruc-
tions given were qualified by other explanatory instruc-
tions. Counsel acknowledges the correctness of the in-
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APPELLANTS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 
III AND IV 
While appellant has not referred to any transcript 
nun1ber under these assignments, it appears counsel 
complains that the court did not give his _requested in-
struction No.6 (Tr. 26) in the exact-form requested. The 
request was long and confused and the substance of the 
same vvas covered by the court's instruction No. 4 (Tr. 
55, 349) and No. 3 ( Tr. 54, 348), wherein the jury qual-
ified the care required of Robert Manning according to 
his age, capacity and experience. 
It has repeatedly been held that there is no error 
in refusing a requested instruction if the substance is 
given in another instruction. 
11rimble v. Union P1ac. Stages, ~05 Utah 457, 142 
-Pac. (2d) 674; 
D.avis v. Heifner, 54 Utah 428, 181 Pac. 587; 
BergmGJn v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 53 Utah 
213 at page 225, 178 Pac. 68; 
M:aore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 Pac. (2d) 676; 
Brooks v. Ut·ah Hotel Co., 159 Pac. (2d) 127, 108 
Utah 220 at page 22:6. 
Appellant c-omplains of that part of the court's in-
struction No. 4 ( Tr. 55, 349) which instructed the jury 
that: 
''The age, capacity and experience of the 
said Robert Manning are factors ·which you may 
take into consideration together with all of the 
evidence in the case in determining whether or 
not the defendant was negligent, so far as such 
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factors \Yere known to or in the exercise of 
ordinary care could have been seen by the~ de-
fendant." 
The portion of the instruction con1plained of \va::; 
favorable to plaintiff in that in deter1nining \vhether 
plaintiff used reasonable and ordinary eare 1Inder all of 
the circunzsfa:nces as defined under the court's instruc-
tion X o. 3 ( Tr. 5-!, 348), the jury \vas there by advised and 
effectively instructed that greater care was required of 
defendant "~here children were involved. 
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO·. V 
~\s explained in the preceding paragraph, the jury 
having been instructed that defendant was required to 
exercise ordinary care under all of the circun1stances, 
and in particular having regard to the safety of chil-
dren, and the court having fully instructed the jury on 
several of its instructions em:p1hasi.zing each of the claim-
ed or alleged ·acts of negligence of -d.efenda.nt, the jury 
was effectively instructed on the contents and substance 
of plaintiff's requested instruction No. 4 ( Tr. 24). Fur-
thermore the instruction as requested was misleading 
and improper in that the first sentence reads: 
''You are instructed that it is u.ndisputed 
that the defendant Powers in driving along and 
upon the highway at the time and place in ques-
tion observed the deceased, Robert 11anning, pro-
ceeding along and upon the highway in front of 
him upon his bicycle, that he intended to pass hin1 
and that he knew at said tim·e that the deceased 
was a young boy." 
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'Vhile it is undisputed that defendant did see Robert 
l\1anning proceeding along the highway, the evidence 
'vas that he, Robert Manning, was to the west or side of 
the defendant on the edge of the shoulder, with am en-
tire traffic lame separwtfifn.g them, and it would have been 
1nisleading and erroneous to instruct the jury to the 
exact request, namely: That it was undisputed that 
Robert l\fanning was ''proceeding along and upon the 
highway in t~ont of him." 
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERR10'R N:O. VI 
By this assigned error, appellant complains of the 
court's instruction No. 10 (Tr. 61, 353). 
By the court's instruction No. 1 (c) ( Tr. 50, 345 ), 
and the court's instruction No.8 (Tr. 59, 352), the jury 
was instructed on plaintiff's alleged claim of failure to 
sound his horn. The first part of No. 8 given at defend-
ant's request read: 
''You are instructed that the laws of the 
State of Utah require that whenever any person 
who is driving or operating an automobile on any 
public highway desires to overtake and pass a 
vehicle proceeding in front of him, the person 
driving the automobile coming from the rear shall 
by audible signal indicate his intention to pass 
the vehicle proceeding in front of him, thereby 
giving to such overtaken driver or rider an op-
portunity to turn immediately to the right side 
of the traveled portion of such highway so as 
to allow one-half of the highway to the person 
desiring to pass, and to warn the overtaken driver 
or rider of the approach of the oncoming vehi-
c1e, and failure to give an audible signal of in-
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tention to pass under such circu1nstances con-
stitutes negligence.'· 
The statute inYolYed, Secti.on ;)7-7-:20G(a.), [:tali ('1ode ~1n­
notated 1943, rea.ds: 
"'Ever)- n1otor vehicle \Yhen operated upon 
a high,vay shall be equipped \Yith a horn in good 
\vorking order and capable of e1nitting sound 
audible under normal conditions froin a distance 
of not less than 200 feet, but no horn or other 
\Yarning device shall e1nit an unreasonably loud 
or harsh sound or a 'vhistle. The driver· of a 
Jnotor vehicle shall when reasolfl)ably necessary to 
insure safe openation give ·O!Udible warn!itng with 
h1i.s hor.n but shall not otherwise use such horn 
when upon a highway.'' 
The court's instruction No. 10 read: 
"You are instructed that the law of this state 
pertaining to the requirement of sounding a horn 
on a motor vehicle does not require the use of a 
horn in passing, if the driver of a vehicle intends 
to pass another vehicle under any and all circum~ 
st·atnoes. Therefor.e the question of sounding the 
horn is a matter which is left to the sound judg-
m·ent of the operator of the motor vehicle irn the 
exercise .of ordinary care, and the failure to sound 
a horn immediately prior to the happening of an 
accident does not constitute negligence as a mat-
ter of law.'' 
The court did not say that it was entirely left to 
the defendant to determine if it was necessary to sound 
the horn, except by so doing he was''li;n the e.rercise of 
ordilna.ry care.'' In · other words, if the jury believed 
from all of the circumstances, defendant in ·t1he exercise 
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of ordilnary care did not sound the horn, then he was not 
negligent in such particular. 
In Nels~on v. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 Pac. (2d) 272, it 
was held error to instruct the jury the defendant was 
under an absolute duty to sound the horn. 
INSTRUCTIONS ~CONSTRUED IN ENTIRETY 
Referring to instructions to the jury, the court in 
Olsen 'V. Oregon 8. L. R. R. C~o., 24 Utah 4-60, 68 Pac. 
148, said: 
" 'The charge is entitled to a reasonable in-
terpretation. It is construed as a whole, in the 
same connected way in which it was given, upon 
the presumption that the jury did not overlook 
any portion, but gave due weight to it as a whole; 
and this is so although it consist of clauses ori-
ginating with different counsel, and applicable 
to different phases of the evidence. If, when so 
construed, it presents the law fairly and correctly 
to the jury, in a manner not calculated to mislead 
them, it will afford no ground for reversing the 
judgment, 81 though some of its expressions, if 
standing alone, might he regarded as erroneous, 
or because some of them, taken abstractly, may 
have been erroneous.' Anderson v. Mining Co., 
16 Utah 38, 50 Pac. 815; State v. McCoy, 15 Utah 
141, 49 Pac. 420; Re~ese v. Mining Co., 17 Utah 
496, 54 Pac. 759." · · 
See also State v. McCoy, 15 Utah 141, 49 Pac. 420. 
In Morgan v. Mammoth Mining Co., 26 Utah 174, 
72 Pac. 688, the court said the fact that one paragraph 
abstractly considered does not state the law with ab-
solute precision does not constitute reversible error. 
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In Daris v. Heiner. 5± Utah 428, 1~1 Pae. 587, it 
\ra~ held that the case "~ould not be rever~ed for techni-
cal fla.,vs or particular form of instruetion8 'vithin the 
discretion of the trial judge. See also Bergntan P. Den-
're.r & R. G. l'V. R. Co .. 53 Utah 213, 178 Pae. 68; l\1e-
Master v. Salt La.ke Tr,nnsport.ati.on, 108 Utah 207, 159 
Pac. (2d) 121; Brooks r. [Ttah Hotel Conrpany_, 108 Utah 
220, 159 Pac. (2d) 127; and S;nith r. Coluntbus Buggy 
Com pa.ny, ±0 Utah 580, 123 Pac. 580. 
The issues of negligence and contributory negligence 
\vere fairly and impartially tried. The instructions taken 
as a whole and viewed in the light of the several claims 
of negligence and contributory negligence denied by 
each opposing party and the several statutory provi-
sions and common law duties involved, substantially and 
fairly presented the issues. Counsel's complaints at 
n1ost are of technical defects as to arrange1nents or form. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case establishes that defendant 
did not run the Manning boy down as contended by ap-
pellant, and the dent in !t:he rear of the bicycle was not 
oaused by the f.ront of defendant's oar. The physical facts 
corroborated by testimony shows that when Bobbie 
Barnett called to Bobbie Manning, the latter in his haste 
to join his companions, suddenly turned without warning 
across an entire lane of traffic and into defendant's car 
before defendant could have time to avert a collision. 
Defendant was not violating the rules of the road and 
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he had no reason to anticipate that Robert Manning 
would suddenly make such a dart across the street. The 
physical facts justified a directed verdict in favor of 
defendant and the verdict is more than sustained by 
the evidence. 
It is respectfully submitted that a re-trial is not 
justified. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON 
E. F. BALDWIN, JR. 
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